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POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: TO THE VICTOR GO FEWER SPOILS
Diane Rotering
I. INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, November 2, 1976, American voters across the
nation elected new government officials. As a consequence, thou-
sands of public employees faced the prospect of dismissal due to the
fact that their new boss, be it President of the United States or local
sheriff, maintained a different political persuasion. However, due to
a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, this prospect
of dismissal presented a threat to fewer employees than ever before.
In Elrod v. Burns,' the Supreme Court ruled that dismissing
political patronage employees violates public employees' rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments. Such dismissals, the
Court reasoned, unconstitutionally restrict employees' political be-
liefs and associations.' Thus, a nonpolicymaking, non-confidential
government employee may not be discharged from a job that she is
satisfactorily performing, upon the sole ground of her political be-
liefs.3 In other words, wholesale political dismissal of public employ-
ees following a change of administration is unconstitutional.
The implications of Elrod are substantial. Many public em-
ployees, both federal and state, are already regulated by various
civil service systems.4 With the advent of first amendment consider-
ations, political patronage will be restricted to an even greater ex-
tent. Perhaps such restriction is necessary, as adherence to the pre-
scriptions of civil service systems often has been more superficial
than real. Much bureaucratic and administrative inefficiency in
non-civil service systems is directly attributable to the wholesale
turnovers which historically accompany changes of administration.
Yet it is possible that the political party system cannot survive
without the incentive of patronage employment.' Elrod's import-
1. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Elrod].
2. Id. at 2689.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2692 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. Justice Powell raised this issue in the following terms:
It is naive to think that [party organization] political activities are motiviated at
[local] levels by some academic interests in "democracy" or other public service
impulse. For the most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward
generates a major portion of the local political activity supporting parties. It is
difficult to overestimate the contributions to our system by the major political
parties. . ..
Id. at 2695.
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ance stems from the Court's specific recognition that the first
amendment reigns supreme, regardless of the patronage system's
historical contributions to democratic government.
This note will review previous decisions concering the freedoms
of belief and association of public employees,' and analyze the rela-
tionship of these freedoms to patronage dismissals. Additionally,
Elrod's complementary effect on Montana's Human Rights Act7 will
be discussed.
II. FORERUNNERS OF ELROD
A. Public Employment and the First Amendment
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,' the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a state could not terminate a person's public employ-
ment merely because the employee was a member of the Commun-
ist Party.9 The Court ruled that termination of public employment
solely because of the employee's membership in the Communist
Party, absent a showing of "specific intent to further the unlawful
aims of the Party," was an unconstitutional infringement of the
associational freedoms afforded by the first amendment. 0 Although
the Court did not recognize any constitutional right to public em-
ployment, it summarily rejected the argument that constitutional
rights, such as association and belief, could properly be "infringed
by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"
such as public employment." The Supreme Court quoted with ap-
proval from the Second Circuit's decision in Keyishian:
6. This comment will not review every decision concerning the first amendment and
public employment, but only those decisions which directly presage the patronage contro-
versy. For a more complete discussion of the first amendment and public employment, see
Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND.LEG.FORuM 35 (1969).
7. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], §§ 64-301 to
330 (Supp. 1975).
8. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
9. Appellants in Keyishian were faculty members of a state university. Their employ-
ment was conditioned upon their compliance with a "New York plan" which was intended
to prohibit members of subversive organizations from public employment. Under the plan,
appellants were required to sign certificates stating that they were not Communists, or if they
had ever been Communists, they had communicated that fact to the university president.
Failure to so certify would result in dismissal. Id. at 591-92.
10. Id. at 609. See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute which imposed criminal penalties on any Com-
munist Party member employed in a private plant that had been designated a "defense
facility" by the Secretary of Defense. To escape prosecution, the employee had to either
terminate employment or terminate party membership. Since "the operative fact on which
the job disability depends is the exercise of an individual's right of association," the statute
was deemed unconstitutional. Id. at 263.
11. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967). The reasoning that the
government may not achieve indirectly what it is forbidden from doing directly is a recurring
theme in this discussion.
[Vol. 38
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[Tihe theory that public employment which may be denied alto-
gether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how un-
reasonable, has been uniformly rejected."
In 1972, the Supreme Court reinforced the reasoning of
Keyishian in Perry v. Sindermann.13 In Perry, a college professor
sued for reinstatement, claiming that his dismissal was based upon
his public criticism of the board of regents, and thus constituted
infringement of the first amendment right to free speech. In re-
manding the case for a determination of the factual basis for the
professor's dismissal, the Court held:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmen-
tal benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially his interest in freedom of speech."4
The Court correctly reasoned that if the government were allowed
to deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally pro-
tected speech, exercise of that freedom would be penalized and
inhibited. This would permit the government to "produce a result
which [it] could not command directly."' 5 Such an interference
with constitutional rights is impermissible."8 The Court has applied
this direct-indirect principle to many areas, "but most often . . .
to denials of public employment . . . regardless of the public em-
ployee's contractual or other claim to a job."' 7
B. Extension To Patronage Dismissals
When the Supreme Court accorded first amendment protection
against employment dismissal to members of the Communist Party,
Republicans and Democrats facing such dismissal were certain to
voice a similar constitutional challenge. Initial attempts to be heard
on the issue met with rapid refusals by the courts. American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp 8 typified
the courts' response to cases in which the patronage issue first ap-
12. Id. at 605-06, quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1965).
13. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
14. Id. at 597.
15. Id., quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
16. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
17. Id., citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
18. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
1977]
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peared. Shapp, a 1971 case, held that a state employee who himself
had obtained employment through political patronage had no fed-
eral or state constitutional or statutory right to complain of dis-
missal because of patronage. 9 "Those who, figuratively speaking,
live by the political sword must be prepared to die by the political
sword."20 A public employee, the Pennsylvania court reasoned, is
"'essentially an employee at will.' ",'
In 1972, two circuit courts split on the patronage dismissal
question. In Alomar v. Dwyer,2 the Second Circuit held there was
no constitutional prohibition against the dismissal of governmental
employees because of their political affiliations or beliefs. The Sev-
enth Circuit, however, reached an opposite conclusion in Illinois
State Employees Union v. Lewis." Because the opinion in Lewis,
written by then Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens, was relied on by
the Supreme Court in Elrod, and in many respects is better rea-
soned than Elrod, it is reviewed here in some detail.
The plaintiffs in Lewis were non-civil service employees of the
Illinois Secretary of State's office. A Republican was appointed to
fill the unexpired term of the deceased Secretary, a Democrat.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs, who were also Democrats, were termi-
nated. Plaintiffs sued, claiming their discharge was based upon pol-
itical affiliations. Defendants argued that a tradition of almost two
hundred years of uninterrupted acceptance of the patronage system
could not be overcome by judicial fiat. To resolve this issue, the
court first reviewed applicable precedent. Early cases held public
employees had no constitutional right to their jobs, and thus there
could be no valid constitutional objection to summary removal.' 4
Later cases held that public employers were more limited.25 Refer-
ring to Keyishian and Weiman, the court commented:
We think it unlikely that the Supreme Court would consider these
plaintiffs' interest in freely associating with members of the Demo-
cratic Party less worthy of protection than the [Communist]
employees' interest in associating with Communists or former
Communists. 8
19. Id. at 535, 280 A.2d at 378.
20. Id. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378.
21. Id. at 534, 280 A,2d at 377-78, quoting from Scott v. Pennsylvania Parking Auth.,
402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278, 280 (1960).
22. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
23. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972).
24. Id. at 568, citing Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
25. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
26. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 38
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In Lewis, the court recognized that public employees' first
amendment freedoms with respect to political activities are not ab-
solute.27 State interests may justify some curtailment of public em-
ployees' political activities. At the same time, the court declared:
[I]t seems perfectly clear that the abject and complete surrender
of a citizen's first amendment rights could never be
justified.* * * The basic rights of citizenship survive acceptance
of public employment."8
If the conditions of public employment merely involve some curtail-
ment of first amendment rights, as opposed to abject surrender,
state interests may, if strong enough, justify the curtailment. 9 The
burden of proving such justification is on the State, and "[iun view
of the importance which the [Supreme] Court has consistently
attached to the first amendment rights of the citizenry, that burden
is a heavy one."3
The Lewis court then addressed the justifications advanced by
the State in defense of the patronage dismissals sub judice. The
State argued first that because plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the
patronage system, they should not be heard to complain of the
foreseeable consequences of that system." Although according this
theory some validity, the court responded that it may only limit the
scope of relief, not foreclose relief altogether. 2 More importantly,
courts will not lightly assume waiver of a fundamental first amend-
ment right such as freedom of association.Y "'[C]ourts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental con-
stitutional rights and . . . we 'do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights.' ",31
27. Id. at 572, citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
28. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 572 (7th Cir. 1972).
29. Id., citing Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1972).
31. Recall that this rationale was the basis of the Pennsylvania court's decision in
Shapp.
32. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 573 (7th Cir. 1972).
33. Id. at 574.
34. Id., quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) which quoted Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). Also cited by Lewis were Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 343 (1970); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
514 (1962); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 and n. 11 (1949); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
See also Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1966):
Even were we to assume . . . that a state may constitutionally exact, on pain of
loss of employment ... , the waiver of a constitutional right, we would be unable
to find any justification for denying the right to withdraw [the waiver].
But see Mr. Justice Harlan's separate opinion. Id. at 248.
19771
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As a second justification the State contended that political af-
filiation was a relevant and proper qualification for certain employ-
ment. Although the court conceded this point as to policy-making
and confidential government positions, it held that such a justifica-
tion was not applicable to all employees, and thus did "not afford
a basis for dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims without a trial." 5
Finally, the State argued that effective government administra-
tion requires that public executives be given broad latitude in ap-
pointing, replacing and discharging personnel. Again noting the le-
gitimacy of such a justification in some instances, the court re-
sponded that state and federal employers simply do not have the
freedom of action enjoyed by private employers, even as to internal
operations. 6 "The price which a government must pay to protect
the constitutional liberties of its employees is some loss of the effi-
ciency enjoyed by private employers; [but] the Supreme Court has
repeatedly decided that the value of those individual liberties is well
worth the cost. '37
Of greater significance to the Lewis court was that the impact
on the body politic had to be considered whenever the free political
choice of public servants was inhibited or manipulated by the selec-
tive award of public benefits. 38 Even though the patronage system
might be defended in the name of democratic tradition, the Seventh
Circuit determined that patronage's "paternalistic impact on the
political process is actually at war with the deeper traditions of
democracy embodied in the First Amendment. ' 3
In 1974 the Fourth Circuit considered the patronage dismissal
question, and was apparently unimpressed with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analysis. In Nunnery v. Barber,40 the court allowed the pa-
tronage dismissal of a liquor store manager. Crucial to the court's
decision, however, was a West Virginia statute specifically provid-
ing that liquor store managers exercised such public duties that
political dismissal therefrom would not be improper. 4' In 1975 Burns
v. Elrod reached the Seventh Circuit.2 Following the "scholarly and
35. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 575, citing Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
897-98 (1961).
37. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 576: "Of greater significance is the fact that as the number of employees
affected is increased, the importance of preserving their First Amendment freedoms likewise
grows."
39. Id.
40. 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974).
41. W. VA. CODE, ch. 29, art. 6, § 2 (1976).
42. 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975).
370 [Vol. 38
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persuasive" opinion of Judge Stevens in Lewis, the court found
wholesale patronage dismissals to be unconstitutional."
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ELROD
To fully understand Elrod, the Court's decision must be viewed
in perspective. The opinion, written by Justice Brennan, does not
reflect a majority, but rather a plurality." The disagreement regis-
tered by the two concurring justices focuses upon Justice Brennan's
failure to consistently differentiate between the entire patronage
system and the narrow issue of patronage dismissal.45 It is clear,
however, that a majority of the Court found patronage dismissal of
governmental employees to be unconstitutional. Elrod is further
limited in that the holding applies solely to nonpolicymaking em-
ployees. Finally, Elrod is not applicable to employment regulated
by statutory civil service systems.
In Elrod, the Republican sheriff of Cook County was replaced
by Richard Elrod, a Democrat. Respondents had all been employees
under the Republican administration. They were non-civil service
employees and, therefore, were not covered by any statute prohibit-
ing arbitrary discharge. Subsequent to Sheriff Elrod's assumption
of office, respondents were discharged from their employment be-
cause they neither supported nor belonged to the Democratic Party,
and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of the Party leaders.
Prior to discussing the merits, the Court responded to two juris-
dictional questions interposed by the appellants. In the first, appel-
lants maintained that the political question doctrine made this case
inappropriate for judicial resolution. A question is "political" when
its resolution is committed by the Constitution to a branch of the
federal government other than the Court." It is thus "the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'-4 The Court
therefore determined that merely because "matters related to a
State's . . .elective process are implicated by this Court's resolu-
tion of a question [that] is not sufficient to justify our withholding
decision of a question."4 Moreover, Elrod was concerned solely with
43. Id. at 1135.
44. Justices White and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's opinion, with Justices
Stewart and Blackmun concurring in the result. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision
of the case.
45. Elrod, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2690 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
47. Id. at 210.
48. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2679 (1976). The Lewis court phrased it differently:
[Olur duty to accord appropriate respect to a state's sovereignty does not require
19771
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a question of constitutionality, "a function which is ultimately the
responsibility of the Supreme Court."49 Regarding the second juris-
dictional issue, appellants argued that the separation of powers doc-
trine also militated against judicial resolution. The Court sum-
marily dismissed this contention by noting that the separation of
powers, as with the political question doctrine, had no applicability
to the federal judiciary's relationship to the states. 0
Moving to the merits, the Court identified the costs of the polit-
ical patronage system as: (1) a restriction of an individual's belief
and free association, and (2) a disproportionate tipping of the elec-
toral process scales in favor of the incumbent party.5 The Court
found the former to be the more important consideration as
"political belief and association constitute the core of those activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment. 52 The decisions in
Keyishian and Perry were "[p]articularly pertinent to the constitu-
tionality of the practice of patronage dismissals. 5 3 The reasoning of
these cases, which the Court found fundamental to the Elrod deci-
sion, is the familiar theme that the government may not do indi-
rectly what it cannot do directly:
The threat of dismissal for failure to provide [support for the
employer's political party] unquestionably inhibits protected be-
lief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support
only penalizes its exercise. The belief and association which Gov-
ernment may not ordain directly are achieved by indirection. 4
The inquiry into constitutionality does not stop upon determi-
nation that patronage dismissal infringes upon first amendment
rights. First amendment protections are not absolute: "Restraints
[on the exercise of first amendment rights] are permitted for ap-
propriate reasons."55 Keyishian and Perry have continued import-
ance in the inquiry. Not only do they establish a presumptive prohi-
bition on infringement, but they also stand for the proposition that
us to accord finality to a decision to dismiss an employee for an impermissible
reason, or to a policy of discrimination against members of a particular race, reli-
gion or political faith in the award or withdrawing of public benefits.
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 567 (7th Cir. 1972).
49. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2679 (1976).
50. Id. Again, the Lewis court was more specific: "If, however, a discharge is motivated
by considerations of race, religion or punishment of constitutionally protected conduct, it is
well settled that the State's action is subject to federal review." Illinois State Employees
Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
51. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2681 (1976).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2682, citing Keyishian and Perry.
54. Id. at 2683 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. See also pp. 368-69 & note 26 supra.
372 [Vol. 38
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public employment, which may be denied altogether, may not be
subjected to unreasonable conditions." Significant impairment of
first amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny.57 "Thus en-
croachment 'cannot be justified upon a mere showing of some legiti-
mate state interest.' The interest advanced must be paramount, one
of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show
the existence of such an interest." [citation omitted] .5' In addition,
the means employed by the government to further its interest must
be more than merely rationally related to that end. The government
must "'[employ] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement . . .'" of first amendment rights." If a less drastic
means of fulfilling the state's legitimate interests exists, the State
may not choose a scheme that stifles fundamental interests. 0
In short, if conditioning the retention of public employment on the
employee's support of the in-party is to survive constitutional chal-
lenge, it must further some vital government end by a means that
is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving
that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of consti-
tutionally protected rights."
The Court then considered the various interests advanced by
the appellants as justifications for the infringement of first amend-
ment rights caused by patronage dismissal,"2 first considering the
need to insure effective government and the efficiency of public
employees. Appellants argued that employees of political persua-
sions other than that of the party in power will not have the incen-
tive to work effectively, and may even subvert the incumbent ad-
ministration's efforts to govern effectively. The Court found this
interest insufficient to justify the infringement for several reasons:
the inefficiency resulting from the wholesale replacement of public
employees belies the argument that patronage dismissal aids gov-
ernmental effectiveness; the prospect of dismissal after an election
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2684, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 (1976) and NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
58. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684 (1976), citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 88 (1975);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464-66
(1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
59. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684 (1976), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1975).
60. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684-85 (1976), quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59
(1973).
61. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2685 (1976) (footnote omitted).
62. The Court cautioned against confusing the interests of partisan organizations with
governmental interests. Only the latter suffices as a possible justification for the infringement
of first amendment rights. Id. at 2684.
1977]
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is only a disincentive to efficient performance; a patronage em-
ployee will not necessarily be a more qualified person; and it is
doubtful that the mere difference of political persuasion encourages
poor performance. 3 In reviewing the record, the Court discerned
that considerations of governmental effectiveness and employee ef-
ficiency did not appear to be the motivating factors behind the
dismissals. 4 The employer had less drastic means available for in-
suring effectiveness and efficiency, specifically, discharge for good
cause based on insubordination or poor performance. Appellants
argued further that patronage serves the interests of effective gov-
ernment and employee efficiency by giving the employees of an
incumbent party the incentive to perform well in order to preserve
their party's incumbency and thereby retain their jobs. Patronage,
according to this argument, makes employees highly accountable to
the public. Again the Court felt that less intrusive means, such as
dismissal for cause and merit systems, were available.6 Thus, the
Court found no justification for patronage dismissal as a means of
furthering governmental effectiveness and employee efficiency. 7
The need to preserve political loyalty of employees so that rep-
resentative government will not be undercut by tactics obstructing
implementation of policies sanctioned by the electorate was also
offered as an interest justifying encroachment upon the first amend-
ment. Although the Court acknowledged the validity of such a justi-
fication, it believed, as did the Lewis court, that it was insufficient
to sanction wholesale patronage dismissal. Instead, the Court held:
"Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is suffi-
cient to achieve this governmental end." 8 The Court acknowledged
that distinguishing between policymaking and nonpolicymaking
positions would be difficult in some instances, but concluded,
"[tihe nature of the [employee's] responsibilities is critical." 9
63. Id. at 2685.
64. Id., n. 18.
65. Id. at 2686.
66. Id.
67. The lack of such justification distinguished Elrod from CSC v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947). In these latter cases, legislative restraints on political activity by public employees
were upheld despite the obvious encroachment on first amendment rights because they did
serve in a necessary manner to protect efficient and effective government. Elrod, 96 S.Ct.
2673, 2686 (1976).
68. Id. at 2687.
69. Id. The Court set forth several criteria as a future guide for making a determination:
An employee with responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope
more likely functions in a policymaking position. . . . [Clonsideration should also
be given to whether the employee acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the
implementation of broad goals . . . . [Tihe burden of establishing this justifica-
[Vol. 38
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The final interest offered as justification for limiting first
amendment freedoms was that the patronage system preserves the
democratic process. That is, patronage helps a democratic govern-
ment operate successfully, and consequently exacts a price for its
service.70 Although preservation of the democratic process is cer-
tainly an interest which may justify limitation on first amendment
freedoms,7 the Court did not believe that elimination of patronage
dismissals would destroy party politics.7 2 To the contrary, the Court
thought "if patronage contributes at all to the elective process, that
contribution is diminished by the practice's impairment of the
same."7 3 Thus, the Court held patronage dismissal of nonpolicy-
making employees to be unconstitutional under the first and four-
teenth amendments.74
Interestingly, the Court only indirectly discussed the issue of
waiver - that respondents, themselves the beneficiaries of previous
patronage dismissals, should not be heard to complain of the
practice.75 Political offices change hands numerous times and in this
sense the patronage dismissal system operates evenhandedly in the
long run, but the Court concluded that "protected interests are still
infringed and thus the violation remains.""
IV. MONTANA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Elrod's implications will not be as profound in Montana as in
other States due to the Montana legislature's foresighted enactment
of the Human Rights Act. 77 The Act provides:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for the state or any of its
political subdivisions:
(c) to refuse employment to a person, or to bar him from employ-
ment, or to discriminate against him in compensation or in a term,
condition, or privilege of employment because of his political be-
liefs.7 1
tion as to any particular [employee] will rest on the [government], cases of doubt
being resolved in favor of the particular [employee].
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id., citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); CSC v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
72. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2687 (1976).
73. Id. at 2688.
74. Id. at 2689.
75. Mr. Justice Powell did raise this issue in his dissent. Id. at 2693.
76. Id. at 2683.
77. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 64-301 to 330 (Supp. 1975).
78. Id. § 64-306(5)(c).
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This prohibition does not apply to policymaking positions on the
immediate staff of an elected official of the executive branch," to
the appointment by the governor of a director of a "principal" de-
partment, or to the immediate staff of the majority and minority
leadership of the Montana legislature.80 Thus, the Act provides sta-
tutory protection against patronage dismissal to the same employ-
ees who are covered by Elrod. In fact, Montana's statute may go
beyond the confines of Elrod. The statutory language could be inter-
preted to protect policymaking employees holding important de-
partmental positions but who are not directors of "principal" de-
partments. Although the federal constitution may not require such
extensive protection, it is certainly within the legislative prerogative
to accord greater protection under the state constitution s.8
V. CONCLUSION
By utilizing the rationale which protects Communist Party
members against arbitrary dismissal from public employment, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the dismissal of a nonpol-
icymaking public employee on the sole ground of political belief and
association. This decision likely will improve substantially govern-
mental effectiveness and employee efficiency. In Montana, the deci-
sion will augment a legislative enactment which attempts to achieve
the same results. Although Chief Justice Burger criticized Elrod for
"trivializing" constitutional adjudication,"' the decision reaffirms
the Supreme Court's long-standing dedication to the primacy of the
first amendment.
79. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 1 defines "executive branch" as "a governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and audi-
tor."
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 64-306(5)(c) (Supp. 1975).
81. For illustration, the Supreme Court held in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972),
that the sixth amendment, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
does not require jury unanimity in criminal convictions. However, the Montana legislature
gave criminal defendants greater protection than that required by the sixth amendment when
it enacted R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1915(a) (Supp. 1975), which requires jury unanimity.
82. Elrod, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2690 (1976) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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